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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court 
addressed questions regarding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Beginning in 1963 with the watershed decision of Gideon v. Wainwright,1 
right to counsel jurisprudence has developed and evolved into an 
interestingly complicated body of law. Initially, Gideon was hailed as a victory 
for human-rights advocates and promised a hopeful change in the 
administration of criminal justice. 
Today, Gideon’s legacy faces new challenges. With indigent defense 
declared “shamefully inadequate” by the American Bar Association (“ABA”) 
and the American brand of justice considered “‘a system of pleas,’”2 the 
Supreme Court has grappled with the jurisprudential reach of Gideon. In the 
plea-bargaining trilogy—Padilla v. Kentucky,3 Missouri v. Frye,4 and Lafler v. 
Cooper5—the Court wrestled with a number of questions concerning the 
right to effective assistance of counsel in the plea-bargaining context. While 
these decisions appear to comport with the principles espoused in Gideon, a 
closer look reveals that the plea-bargaining trilogy will likely suffer a fate 
similar to Gideon: problems in implementation and enforcement. 
This Essay argues that the principles espoused in Padilla, Frye, and Lafler 
are a natural extension of the modern understanding of Gideon. However, as 
in Gideon, the Court declined to provide guidance on implementation and 
enforcement of these plea-bargaining principles. Absent such guidance, the 
constitutional protections advanced in the plea-bargaining cases will 
probably not be realized. 
Part I of this Essay discusses the modern understanding of Gideon, 
particularly in the plea-bargaining context, thereby providing a basis on 
which to evaluate the principles announced in Padilla, Frye, and Lafler. Part II 
offers an overview of the current state of criminal justice in America—the 
context underlying the plea-bargaining trilogy. Focusing on indigent 
 
 1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 2. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 
1376, 1388) (2012)). 
 3. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 4. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399. 
 5. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376. 
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defense, plea-bargaining, and mass incarceration, this Part presents a brief 
synopsis of the problems in the criminal-justice system. Part III provides a 
summary of the plea-bargaining trilogy highlighting the most important 
aspects of each case.  Part IV analyzes the ways in which the plea-bargaining 
trilogy jurisprudentially comports with Gideon’s legacy. This Part also argues 
that the implementation of the principles announced in these cases will 
suffer from a distorted application as history demonstrates occurred with 
Gideon. Part V concludes the Essay with a brief summary. 
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The right to counsel and specifically, indigent defense, has long been 
accepted as an integral piece of federal criminal prosecutions. However, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, it was far from clear whether the 
same understanding of the right to counsel was recognized in the states. A 
large part of the jurisprudence that courts developed in this area addressed 
the constitutional dimensions of this right as well as state responsibilities in 
recognition of the imperatives announced by the Court. This Part will 
discuss the development of the constitutional right to counsel, and 
introduce its use in the plea-bargaining context. 
The first case in which the United States Supreme Court required a 
state to provide counsel for indigent defendants on constitutional grounds 
was Powell v. Alabama in 1932.6 The Court held that it was the duty of the 
trial court to assign counsel in capital cases “where the defendant is unable 
to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense 
because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like.”7 Rooted in 
principles of justice and fairness, the Powell opinion concluded that the right 
to counsel was of a “fundamental character” constitutionally akin to freedom 
of speech and freedom of the press.8 This “fundamental character” placed 
the right to counsel within the protections guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby requiring state compliance.9 
In Betts v. Brady in 1942, the Court declined to extend the right to 
counsel to indigent defendants in all criminal cases.10 For the Court, the 
Due Process Clause required the appointment of counsel to an indigent 
defendant only when failure to do so would be “offensive to the common 
and fundamental ideas of fairness.”11 Betts stopped expansion of indigent 
defense to the states.12 For the next two decades, the Court would grapple 
 
 6. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 67–68. 
 9. Id. at 66. 
 10. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 472–73 (1942). 
 11. Id. at 473. 
 12. Id. 
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with questions concerning exactly when a state was required to provide 
counsel to poor defendants. However, in 1963, the Court firmly established 
the right to counsel for indigent defendants in Gideon v. Wainwright. The 
constitutional story of Clarence Earl Gideon begins with the Court’s 
granting certiorari in a pauper’s appeal from a Florida inmate in 1962.13 
Unable to afford counsel, Gideon handwrote his appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court and requested the Court to review the Florida trial court’s 
decision that refused to appoint counsel in Gideon’s criminal case for 
breaking and entering into a poolroom with intent to commit a 
misdemeanor.14 
In 1963, the Court handed down its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, in 
which Clarence Earl Gideon won.15 With the Betts decision lingering and 
stare decisis requiring jurisprudential justification to overrule it, the Court 
reasoned that the principles espoused in Powell v. Alabama provided ample 
precedential support for guaranteeing indigent defendants the assistance of 
counsel.16 Because Powell avowed the fundamental character of the right to 
counsel, Betts erroneously failed to hold that right obligatory on the states.17 
Thus, Betts had to be overruled. 
The Gideon Court also supported its judgment with notions of fairness. 
In the opinion, the Court discussed the necessity of counsel for the 
achievement of a fair trial.18 Quoting Powell extensively for the proposition 
that lay persons are inexperienced and unskilled in the art of lawyering, the 
Gideon Court rationalized that lawyers are necessary in order to achieve the 
noble ideal of a fair justice system.19 Therefore, the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment required that the states submit to the federal 
system’s understanding of the right to counsel, including an indigent 
defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel. In asserting that although 
“[t]he right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed 
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours,”20 
the Court firmly entrenched fairness ideals in the jurisprudential 
understanding of indigent defense. 
Gideon provides the basis of our modern understanding of the right to 
counsel. While the connection has not always been explicit, the Court’s 
conception of the right to counsel is, and has been, intimately intertwined 
with the due process guarantee of a fair trial. Gideon laid the groundwork for 
the development of the right to counsel in two constitutionally different 
 
 13. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338 (1963). 
 14. Id. at 336–38. 
 15. Id. at 342–45.  
 16. Id. at 341. 
 17. Id. at 341–42. 
 18. Id. at 344. 
 19. Id. at 344–45. 
 20. Id. at 344. 
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directions: through the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel and 
through the “critical stages” analysis. 
A. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
By the 1980s, the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel was 
deeply embedded in American jurisprudence. The Court procedurally 
expanded the right to apply to a number of phases of criminal prosecution, 
including first appeal of right,21 sentencing hearings,22 and some 
misdemeanors where the defendant would actually be imprisoned if 
adjudicated guilty.23 
However, this procedural expansion was short-lived and new questions 
surrounding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel began to percolate. One 
issue presenting itself for constitutional review was the substantive 
understanding of the right to counsel. This was decided in the case of 
Strickland v. Washington.24 
1. Strickland v. Washington 
Strickland v. Washington extended Gideon in that it firmly established that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel included the right to effective 
assistance of counsel.25 However, the test crafted to evaluate claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel set an extremely high threshold for 
defendants to meet. 
In 1976, David Washington was indicted by the State of Florida for 
kidnapping and murder.26 He was “appointed an experienced criminal 
lawyer to represent him.”27 Against counsel’s advice, Washington confessed 
to crimes, waived his right to a jury trial, pled guilty to three capital murder 
charges, and waived his right to an advisory jury at his capital sentencing 
hearing.28 In preparing for the sentencing hearing, defense counsel 
conducted minimal investigation and preparation as he was experiencing a 
“sense of hopelessness” caused by Washington’s disregard of his advice.29 
Washington was sentenced to death and appealed on the ground that his 
lawyer had provided ineffective assistance of counsel.30 The Court granted 
certiorari, using this as an opportunity to craft a constitutional test by which 
 
 21. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
 22. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). 
 23. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).   
 24. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 25. Id. at 686. 
 26. Id. at 671–72. 
 27. Id. at 672. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 672–73. 
 30. Id. at 678. 
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lower courts could evaluate Sixth Amendment claims of inadequate 
representation. 
Strickland set forth a two-pronged test for the resolution of ineffective 
assistance claims. The Court set the benchmark for judging ineffectiveness 
as “whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a 
just result.”31 In the first prong of the test, courts conduct an assessment of 
attorney performance.32 The prong requires the defendant to “show that 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.”33 A court reviewing the case must judge counsel’s 
performance at that time of the conduct at issue, with defendants required 
to point specifically to acts or omissions of counsel that were unreasonable.34 
Courts are to consider the totality of the circumstances using “[p]revailing 
norms of practice” to judge an attorney’s performance.35 In Strickland, the 
Court looked to ABA standards with a specific focus on “The Defense 
Function.”36 Present in the analysis is a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct fell within the range “of reasonable professional judgment.”37 
The second prong of the Strickland test requires courts to determine 
whether counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant. To meet the 
requirements of this prong, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”38 “A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”39 There is 
also a presumption that the judge or jury acted in accordance with the law 
and requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances.40 
However, Strickland was not a unanimous opinion. In a derisive dissent, 
Justice Marshall found the majority’s holdings unlikely “to improve the 
adjudication of Sixth Amendment claims.”41 On the performance issue, 
Marshall found the Court’s standard “malleable” writing that it will “have no 
grip at all” or will be applied with such variation so as to fail to delineate a 
reliable understanding of the Sixth Amendment.42 With regard to prejudice, 
Marshall objected on the basis that such an assessment was difficult to make 
 
 31. Id. at 686. 
 32. Id. at 687. 
 33. Id. at 688. 
 34. Id. at 690. 
 35. Id. at 688. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 690. 
 38. Id. at 694. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id.  
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due to the number of variables that might have changed the outcome of the 
trial.43 Thus, according to Marshall, the Strickland test would do little to 
validate meritorious claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on either 
prong of the test. Marshall’s dissent was prophetic, as the Court would not 
explicitly find a constitutional violation of the Sixth Amendment based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel until the year 2000.44 More importantly, 
Strickland has proven unreasonably difficult to employ with most defendants 
failing to meet the test despite egregious attorney performance. 
The significance of Strickland cannot be overstated. While scholars often 
criticize the Strickland test for the overwhelming difficulty defendants face in 
meeting its requirements, it has been the basis of adjudication for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in a variety of different procedural contexts in 
American criminal prosecutions. One area in which the Court has employed 
Strickland for constitutional analysis is the plea process. 
2. Hill v. Lockhart 
Written just one year after Strickland, Hill v. Lockhart held that courts 
should use the Strickland test to review ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims in the context of guilty plea challenges.45 While the Court slightly 
modified the parameters of Strickland to accommodate the procedural 
differences in the plea process, it preserved the core holding of Strickland. 
In Hill, the petitioner pleaded guilty to first degree murder and theft.46 
Two years after his plea, he filed a habeas petition contending that his 
attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel.47 The heart of his claim 
was that his plea was “involuntary” because defense counsel failed to 
accurately advise him as to when he would be considered parole eligible.48 
The Court determined that while the advice may have been erroneous, it 
certainly was not prejudicial.49 Because petitioner did not claim that he 
would have insisted on trial but for counsel’s mistaken advice, petitioner 
failed on the prejudice prong of Strickland.50 Thus, the Court affirmed the 
denial of petitioner’s habeas petition. 
In declaring that Strickland applied to the plea process, the Court 
constitutionally transitioned from the traditional due process inquiry 
associated with challenged pleas—whether the plea had been voluntary and 
 
 43. Id. at 710. 
 44. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390–98 (2000). 
 45. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1985). 
 46. Id. at 53. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 54. Defense counsel allegedly told petitioner that he would have to serve one-
third of his sentence before being parole eligible while petitioner would in fact have to serve 
half of his sentence. Id. at 55. 
 49. Id. at 60. 
 50. Id.  
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intelligent—to whether defense counsel had been ineffective in her 
representation of the accused. Re-conceptualizing the issue in terms of 
Strickland, the Court determined that where “a defendant is represented by 
counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of 
counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice 
‘was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 
cases.’”51 With this, the Court found a jurisprudential compromise between 
due process guarantees within guilty pleas and the right to effective 
assistance of counsel during the plea process. 
The Hill Court then adjusted the Strickland test to accommodate the 
differences inherent in pleas. It determined that the standard of attorney 
conduct would follow the McMann line of cases, which, in effect, required an 
inquiry into whether the advice of counsel was within the scope of 
competence required by lawyers in criminal cases.52 The Court then tackled 
the prejudice prong of Strickland, stating that the analysis would determine 
whether counsel’s deficient representation “affected the outcome of the 
plea process.”53 The Court stated that “the defendant must show that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”54 Accordingly, 
Strickland was engrafted onto the plea process. However, it would be over 
twenty years before the Court would again address ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims based on mistakes during the plea process. 
B. “CRITICAL STAGE” 
An important piece of the contemporary understanding of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is the “critical stages” jurisprudence.  
Beginning with United States v. Wade in 1967, right to counsel constitutional 
analysis was expanded to include an evaluation of the specifics of criminal 
prosecution for which a defendant was entitled to counsel.55 The subsequent 
cases of Coleman v. Alabama and Rothgery v. Gillespie reasoned through the 
parameters of “critical stage” jurisprudence, providing additional 
constitutional guidance in the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.56 
1. United States v. Wade 
In Wade, the Court introduced the critical stages analysis.57 Respondent 
Wade was arrested for robbing a bank and shortly thereafter appointed 
 
 51. Id. at 56 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 
 52. Id. at 58–59. 
 53. Id. at 59. 
 54. Id. 
 55. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1967). 
 56. Rothgery v. Gillespie, 554 U.S. 191, 211–12 (2008); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 
9 (1970). 
 57. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228. 
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counsel.58 Two weeks later, an FBI agent, without notifying Wade’s attorney, 
arranged a lineup.59 At trial, two employees were asked on direct 
examination whether the bank robber was in the room.60 Both employees 
pointed to the defendant.61 On cross examination, the prior lineup was 
discovered.62 “At the close of [this] testimony, Wade’s counsel moved for a 
judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, to strike the [employees’] 
identifications [of Wade] on the ground that . . . the lineup . . . violated 
[Wade’s] Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth 
Amendment right to . . . counsel.”63 The question for the Court was whether 
“a post-indictment lineup conducted for identification purposes without 
notice to and in the absence of the accused’s appointed counsel” violated 
the Sixth Amendment.64 The Court concluded that it did. 
In making its determination, the Court relied on two primary 
arguments. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan first reasoned that 
contemporary law enforcement practices are different from those the 
Framers confronted and such realities require an appropriate interpretation 
of the Sixth Amendment.65 Instead of the accused confronting only the 
prosecutor and witnesses against him, “today’s law enforcement machinery 
involves critical confrontations” and pretrial proceedings that may resolve 
the prosecution and diminish the trial to a formality.66 Such “‘critical’ 
stages” trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.67 In addition, Justice 
Brennan maintained that principles of stare decisis require the presence of 
counsel where there is a risk of substantial prejudice to a defendant’s 
constitutional rights.68 For Brennan, the principles announced in Powell v. 
Alabama, Escobedo v. Illinois,69 and Miranda v. Arizona70 necessitated that “the 
accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any 
stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where 
counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.”71 
Thus, the constitutional evaluation of pretrial confrontations requires a two-
fold examination of whether there is a risk of substantial prejudice to the 
 
 58. Id. at 220. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 219–20.  
 65. Id. at 224–25. 
 66. Id. at 224. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 227. 
 69. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Court held that defendants are entitled 
to the right to counsel during police interrogations. Id. at 490–91. 
 70. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 71. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226. 
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accused’s constitutional rights inherent in the confrontation and whether 
counsel may help to avoid such prejudice.72 Because of the dangers inherent 
in eyewitness identification, the Court determined that lineups were a 
“critical stage” thereby entitling the accused to the presence of counsel.73 
2. Coleman v. Alabama 
The decision in Coleman v. Alabama extended the right to counsel to 
include lineups noting that lineups are a critical stage. In Coleman, 
petitioners were charged and convicted of assault with intent to murder in 
an Alabama criminal court.74 On appeal, they complained that counsel had 
not been appointed for their preliminary hearing, which had deprived them 
of their right to the assistance of counsel.75 While highlighting that a 
preliminary hearing was not a required phase in criminal prosecutions in 
Alabama, the Alabama Court of Appeals reasoned that nothing that could 
occur in a preliminary hearing would substantially prejudice the petitioners’ 
right to a fair trial.76 The United States Supreme Court disagreed.77 
In a plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court began its 
analysis by examining whether “any pretrial confrontation of the accused” 
without counsel deprived a defendant of his or her right to a fair trial.78 For 
the Court, such a violation occurs if the presence of counsel was necessary to 
effectuate an accused’s right to cross examine witnesses.79 As discussed in 
Wade, a pretrial confrontation is a “critical stage[]” when a threat of 
substantial prejudice to a defendant’s rights exists and counsel may assist in 
avoiding such prejudice.80 
The Court examined why the presence of defense counsel was critical at 
a preliminary hearing. First, counsel may help the accused by uncovering 
weaknesses in the State’s case, resulting in the trial court’s refusal to bind 
the case over for trial.81 An attorney may also effectively cross examine a 
State’s witness, thus developing a mode of impeachment while 
simultaneously preserving favorable testimony for the accused in the case 
where a witness may later become unavailable.82 The assistance of counsel 
may also result in earlier psychiatric examinations and an effective argument 
 
 72. Id. at 227. 
 73. Id. at 239. 
 74. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 3 (1970). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 8. 
 77. Id. at 9–11. 
 78. Id. at 7. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 9. 
 82. Id. 
A15_SILVA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2014  3:55 PM 
2014] RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND PLEA BARGAINING 2229 
for bail.83 Citing Powell, the Court concluded that “[t]he inability of the 
indigent accused on his own to realize these advantages of a lawyer’s 
assistance compels the conclusion that the Alabama preliminary hearing is a 
‘critical stage’ . . . at which the accused is ‘as much entitled to such aid . . . as 
at the trial itself.’”84 Using a harmless error standard, the Court vacated the 
convictions and remanded.85 
3. Rothgery v. Gillespie County 
In 2008, the Court again faced a “critical stages” issue. In this case, the 
Court sought to answer the question of whether the attachment of the right 
to counsel at an accused’s first appearance also requires awareness of this 
proceeding by the prosecutor.86 The majority held that the attachment of 
the right to counsel at the first appearance does not require awareness by 
the prosecutor.87 
Beginning with the textual supposition that the attachment of counsel is 
predicated upon the “commencement” of prosecution, the Court asserted 
that the Sixth Amendment limits attachment of the right to counsel by the 
phrase “criminal prosecutions.”88 Commencement of prosecution is “the 
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings.”89 The Court has 
previously determined such proceedings include the “preliminary hearing, 
indictment, information, or arraignment.”90 For the Court, awareness by the 
prosecutor of the proceeding was not the determinative question.91 Instead, 
the issue was whether the State’s relationship with the accused is “solidly 
adversarial.”92 Where a defendant is formally accused and his liberties 
restricted, the State’s relationship with the defendant is unequivocally 
adversarial thereby triggering the right to counsel.93 
The right to counsel has substantially evolved since Gideon. An indigent 
defendant’s right to counsel requires the effective assistance of counsel. 
Effective assistance of counsel is mandatory not only at trial, but also during 
pretrial confrontations and during the plea process.  To help lower courts 
determine when counsel is constitutionally required, the Court put forth a 
test examining whether the presence of defense counsel is necessary in a 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 9–10 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).  
 85. Id. at 11. 
 86. Rothgery v. Gillespie, 554 U.S. 191, 194–95 (2008). 
 87. Id. at 198. 
 88. Id. (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)).  
 89. Id. (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 90. Id. (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 91. Id. at 202. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 202–03. 
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specific phase of a criminal prosecution in order to prevent substantial 
prejudice to defendant’s rights. It is from this jurisprudential point that the 
plea-bargaining trilogy was decided. However, before delving into these 
recent cases, it is important to discuss the context in which these cases were 
decided. 
II. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
In order to appreciate the importance of the plea-bargaining trilogy, 
one must understand the critical and problematic features of today’s 
criminal justice system. This Part discusses the context underlying Padilla, 
Frye, and Lafler—the era of mass incarceration in America. The criminal 
justice system in America is plagued by a “shamefully inadequate”94 indigent 
defense structure, “meet ‘em and plead ‘em”95 methodology, and an 
incarceral approach to punishment. Understanding that the administration 
of criminal justice carries with it substantial deprivations of freedom and 
liberty, it is critical that it be viewed as fair and equitable by those to whom 
its jurisdiction extends. 
A. INDIGENT DEFENSE 
The modern indigent defense system in America is in a crisis. While 
there are numerous explanations for the current state of indigent defense, 
two main variables that definitively contribute to the problem are 
inadequate funding and excessive caseloads.96 The ABA asserted that 
funding for indigent defense programs is “shamefully inadequate.”97 The 
Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that the United States spends 
approximately $146 billion annually on criminal-justice administration.98 
While the police and prosecutors receive more than half of those funds, 
indigent defense receives only about 4.3% of federal funds and two percent 
of total state and federal funds spent on criminal-justice administration.99 In 
2009, the National Right to Counsel Committee’s first recommendation was 
that legislators provide appropriate funding to indigent defense 
organizations so that adequate services might be provided to the poor.100 
 
 94. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S 
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 38 (2004).  
 95. See infra Part II.B.  
 96. See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, AM. BAR ASS’N, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND 
LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 19–24 (2011). 
 97. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note 94, at 38. 
 98. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002, at 2 tbl. 1.1 (reporting on figures from fiscal year 1999). 
 99. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993, at 2 tbl. 1.2 (reporting on figures from fiscal year 1990). 
 100. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF 
OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 11 (2009).  
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The system is also without financial incentives to attract competent members 
of the private bar.101 
The second variable indigent defense workload is staggering. State 
public defenders have been estimated to carry as many as 1600 cases in a 
given year.102 While the number of indigent criminal cases has increased 
exponentially across the country, there are jurisdictions where the number 
of staff attorneys in indigent defense offices has remained the same since 
1980.103 
In addition to excessive case loads, the indigent defense suffers from an 
untrained workforce. Often no experience is required to secure a job 
representing poor criminal defendants.104 This results in the assignment of 
criminal cases to lawyers with hardly any understanding or skill in the 
representation of a criminal defendant.105 Judges, too, may hinder effective 
representation by electing to appoint counsel they know will not aggressively 
advocate for their clients.106 As David Cole suggests, “good lawyers make the 
task of convicting defendants more difficult.”107 
B. MEET ‘EM AND PLEAD ‘EM 
Today, guilty pleas resolve at least ninety-seven percent of federal 
criminal cases108 and ninety-four percent of state criminal cases.109 “Meet 
‘em and plead ‘em” is today’s mantra in America’s criminal justice system.110 
As “ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,’”111 the 
plea negotiation phase certainly should be a “critical phase.”112 However, the 
plea bargaining process has largely been conducted in the shadows of the 
criminal justice system. Understanding that the lack of transparency in the 
 
 101. David Cole, Gideon v. Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington: Broken Promises, in 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 101, 118–21 (Carol S. Steiker ed. 2006). 
 102.  STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra  note 94, at 17–18. 
 103. LEFSTEIN, supra note 96, at 17 (discussing a Pennsylvania county that had almost 
doubled its intake since 1980 without any increase in the number of staff in the public 
defender’s office). 
 104. Cole, supra note 101, at 121. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 122 (discussing Ron Slick and Joe Frank Cannon, lawyers who are known to 
move quickly and poorly represent clients).  
 107. Id. at 123. 
 108. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 26 (2010), available at www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.  
 109. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE 
COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 25 (2009), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/fssc06st.pdf. 
 110. See Cole, supra note 101, at 120–22. 
 111. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 
1376, 1388 (2012)).  
 112. See infra Part III.A. 
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process insulates it from judicial review, criticisms levied against the process 
have called for some type of regulation and constitutional protections for 
criminal defendants, many of whom are the “least able to represent 
themselves”—poor, uneducated, and often times minorities.113 
It is important to understand that thousands of courts across the 
country serve simply as plea mills which churn out a profit for the county, 
town, or city in which the court is situated.114  From misdemeanors to 
felonies, judges conduct hearings and take pleas without defendants ever 
consulting with or being represented by a lawyer.115 Individuals plead guilty 
on the advice of a lawyer whom they met just minutes before.116  Moreover, 
innocent people may plead guilty to avoid jail without understanding the 
full panoply of consequences associated with their pleas. 
Gideon’s legacy is violated every single day in the United States but 
particularly in the plea bargaining context.  This poses serious Sixth 
Amendment questions.  With prosecutors offering a reduced sentence, 
defense counsel too busy to pay close attention to the details, and a judge 
ready to clear her docket, the system works to encourage the guilty plea.  
C. AMERICA’S INCARCERATION CRISIS 
The United States of America has the highest incarceration rate in the 
world.117 Compared to other nations, the U.S. rate of imprisonment is 750 
per 100,000 residents versus 628 per 100,000 in Russia and 67 per 100,000 
in Denmark,118 and about one of every 136 U.S. residents are 
incarcerated.119 In 2009, the total number of persons imprisoned in the U.S. 
was over two million.120 Perhaps most significant is the fact that over half of 
the prison population will also return to custody within three years of 
release.121 
 
 113.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 370–71 (2010) (requiring attorneys to inform 
immigrant clients of the immigration consequences of criminal convictions).  
 114. Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2152 (2013). 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 5 (2008), available 
at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2008/one%20in%20100.pdf.  
 118. Id. at 5, 35.  
 119. Elizabeth White, 1 in 136 U.S. Residents Behind Bars, COMMON DREAMS (May 22, 2006), 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0522-03.htm. 
 120. HEATHER C. WEST, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009—
STATISTICAL TABLES 19 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf. 
 121. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 117, at 4 (citing a 1994 fifteen-state survey of 
recidivism rates). 
A15_SILVA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2014  3:55 PM 
2014] RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND PLEA BARGAINING 2233 
With regard to indigency, eighty percent of people charged with a 
criminal offense are poor.122 In 1997, at least fifty percent of the people in 
state prison “earned less than $1000 in the month before their arrest.”123 
Moreover, almost seventy percent of state prisoners failed to earn a high 
school diploma.124 Poor and uneducated people are also more likely to 
“languish in jail” awaiting the appointment of a lawyer while they lose their 
homes, their cars, and their jobs.125 Horror stories are told of persons 
accused of crimes sitting in jail for months after their arrest without an 
attorney.126 On the other hand, more affluent criminal defendants have the 
financial capacity to secure private and more experienced defense counsel 
and are typically released from prison immediately.127 
The rate of incarceration in the United States has quadrupled since 
1960, when 126 per 100,000 persons were incarcerated, to 2008, when 504 
per 100,000 persons were incarcerated.128 For Black defendants, the 
incarceration rate comparison is even starker. In 1960, the incarceration 
rate for Blacks was 660 per 100,000 people.129 In 2010, the incarceration of 
Black men was 3074 per 100,000 people in the population.130 While 
“[t]here ha[s] . . . always been racial disparit[y] in [the] American criminal 
justice” system, post-Gideon the disparity has widened.131 “[F]rom the 1920s 
through the 1970s . . . the black/white incarceration disparity” was 
approximately “two-to-one.”132 Today, the Black/White disparity is seven-to-
one.133 At the pinnacle of the War on Drugs, admissions to prison for Blacks 
 
 122. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 
57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006). 
 123. Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE. L.J. 2176, 
2181 (2013). 
 124. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATIONS 1 (2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf.  
 125. Bright & Sanneh, supra note 114, at 2161. 
 126. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 100, at 85–87. 
 127. See id. 
 128. MARGARET WERNER CAHALAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS 
STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850–1984, at 30 (1986), available at https://www.ncjrs. 
gov/pdffiles1/pr/102529.pdf (providing incarceration rates for the 1960s); William J. Sabol, 
Heather C. West & Matthew Cooper, Prisoners in 2008, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., Dec. 2009, at 1, 
6, available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf (discussing imprisonment rates in 
2008).  
 129. Butler, supra note 124, at 2180 (citing Margaret Calahan, Trends in Incarceration in the 
United States Since 1880: A Summary of Reported Rates and the Distribution of Offenses, 25 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 9, 40 tbl.11 (1979)).  
 130. PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  PRISONERS IN 2010, at 27 app. tbl.15 
(rev. 2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf. 
 131. Butler, supra note 123, at 2182. 
 132. Id. (citing Pamela E. Oliver & Marino A. Bruce, Tracking the Causes and Consequences of 
Racial Disparities in Imprisonment 2–3 (Aug. 2001) (unpublished proposal), available at http://www. 
ssc.wisc.edu/~oliver/RACIAL/Reports/nsfAug01narrative.pdf). 
 133. Id. (citing WEST, supra note 120, at 21 tbl.18). 
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quadrupled and reached a level in the year 2000 “more than 26 times the level 
in 1983.”134 The admission for Whites has increased, but only by eight times 
the level in 1983.135 Although the majority of drug abusers in the U.S. are 
white, approximately three-fourths of all prison admissions for drug offenses 
are Black and Latino persons.136 
D. SUMMARY 
The current state of criminal justice in America contradicts the promise 
of Gideon.  While the Gideon Court declined to provide explicit guidance to 
the states on the way in which indigent defense was to be implemented and 
maintained, it did discuss the expectation that such a system ought to be 
fair.137 Today’s criminal justice system is anything but fair. A poor indigent 
defense, a system of plea bargaining, and draconian penal policies all work 
to suggest that the current system is just as problematic as it was in Gideon’s 
time or worse. The accused is plea bargaining, probably to a jail sentence, 
with the assistance of counsel who is herself overworked and underfunded. 
The Court, faced with the reality of the current system, was presented with a 
trio of recent cases that address one aspect of the problem: effective 
assistance of counsel during the plea-bargaining process. 
III. THE PLEA-BARGAINING TRILOGY 
The plea-bargaining trilogy firmly establishes the right to counsel in the 
plea-bargaining context. While Hill asserted that the Strickland test applies to 
the plea process, the plea-bargaining trilogy proclaims the right to effective 
assistance of counsel in plea bargaining itself. Jurisprudentially, these cases 
are a natural extension of the current understanding of the right to counsel. 
The cases also build on Strickland’s prejudice prong, as well as fashion a 
remedy for Sixth Amendment violations during the plea-bargaining process. 
A. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 
Padilla v. Kentucky138 is a game changer in that the case sheds light into 
the shadow system of plea negotiations. In Padilla, the petitioner, Jose 
Padilla, pled guilty to drug charges related to the alleged transportation of a 
large amount of marijuana in Kentucky.139 “Padilla, a native of Honduras, 
ha[d] been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for [over forty] 
 
 134. JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER 
REENTRY 28 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 135. Id.  
 136. MARC MAUER & RYAN SCOTT KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, SCHOOLS AND PRISONS: 
FIFTY YEARS AFTER BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 3 (2004). 
 137. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–44 (1963). 
 138. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).  
 139. Id. at 359. 
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years” and served in the U.S. Armed Forces during Vietnam.140 Padilla 
contended that during discussions with defense counsel, he was assured that 
a conviction on the charges would not result in deportation.141 He further 
argued that, had he known such deportation consequences existed and were 
mandatory upon conviction, he would have insisted on going to trial.142 With 
this, Padilla claimed his attorney had violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
have effective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s incorrect 
advice.143 The majority agreed with Padilla, finding deficient performance, 
but leaving the issue of prejudice resulting from the misinformation 
provided petitioner by defense counsel to the lower courts to decide.144 
In Padilla, the Supreme Court did two critical things. First, it expressly 
stated that plea negotiations are a critical phase of a criminal prosecution 
whereby counsel is required to assist a defendant.145 For support of this 
principle, the Court cited Hill and McMann v. Richardson.146 Secondly, the 
Court established an affirmative duty on defense counsel to advise her client 
of the deportation consequences of conviction.147 The Court reasoned that 
without such a duty, defense counsel would be encouraged to remain silent 
on crucial issues, which would be at odds with the “the critical obligation of 
counsel to advise the client of ‘the advantages and disadvantages of a plea 
agreement.’”148 The Court’s opinion recognized that criminal defendants 
facing deportation are typically those “least able to represent themselves.”149 
The rationale is important as most defendants are poor, uneducated, and in 
desperate need of the advice of counsel. 
B. MISSOURI V. FRYE 
The Court further expanded defendants’ right to effective counsel 
during plea bargaining when it required attorneys to notify defendants of 
any plea offers. In Missouri v. Frye, respondent Galin Frye was charged with 
driving with a revoked license, a felony, in August of 2007.150 The 
prosecutor sent Frye’s defense counsel two formal written plea offers.151 The 
letter stated that on December 28, 2007, both offers would expire.152 
 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 359–60. 
 142. Id.  
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. at 368–70. 
 145. Id. at 373–74. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 368–70. 
 148. Id. at 370 (quoting Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51 (1995)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct 1399, 1404 (2012). 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. 
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Defense counsel failed to advise Frye that the offers were made, and they 
expired without any discussion between Frye and his lawyer.153 Frye pled 
guilty to a class D felony charge without a plea agreement between himself 
and the State.154 The judge sentenced Frye to three years in prison.155 Frye 
appealed, contending that his lawyer’s failure to inform him of the plea 
offers denied him effective assistance of counsel.156 The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.157 
The main issue before the Court was “whether defense counsel has the 
duty to communicate the terms of a formal offer to accept a plea on terms 
and conditions that may result in a lesser sentence, a conviction on lesser 
charges, or both.”158 The Court answered the question in the affirmative and 
found that when defense counsel failed to communicate the offer to his 
client, he failed to provide effective assistance of counsel as required by the 
Sixth Amendment.159 Just as importantly, the Court recognized that plea 
bargains are “central to the administration” of justice.160 The failure to 
recognize this reality would gut much of the Sixth Amendment of its 
meaning because “ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of 
trials.’”161 In order to remain loyal to the constitutional imperative of the 
Sixth Amendment, the Court acknowledged the salience of plea bargaining 
in our system and the necessity of effective counsel during the bargaining 
process.162 
The Court then proceeded to Strickland’s two-pronged analysis. On the 
issue of performance, the fact that defense counsel had not communicated 
the offer to the client was enough to satisfy that prong. However, on the 
issue of prejudice, the Court modified the Strickland inquiry to further 
accommodate the plea-bargaining context. To show prejudice, the Court 
stated that the defendant must show that there was a reasonable probability 
that he would have accepted the plea bargain offered by the prosecutor, that 
the bargain would not have been canceled by the prosecutor, and that it 
would  have been accepted by the trial court.163 The Court remanded to the 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. It is important to note that Frye was again arrested on December 30, 2007 for 
driving with a revoked license. Id. At his January 4, 2008 preliminary hearing, he waived the 
hearing on the August 2007 charge and proceeded to arraignment shortly thereafter. Id. 
During his arraignment, he first plead not guilty then changed his plea to guilty. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1404–05. 
 156. Id. at 1405. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 1408. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 1407. 
 161. Id. (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012)). 
 162. Id. at 1407–09. 
 163. Id. at 1409. 
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trial court to determine whether the prejudice prong under this new 
standard was met. 
C. LAFLER V. COOPER 
While Frye set the parameters for ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
during plea negotiations, Lafler v. Cooper discussed remedies. In Lafler, the 
respondent was charged with a number of felonies, including assault with 
intent to murder.164 Instead of pleading guilty pursuant to an offer for the 
respondent to serve 51 to 85 months, he elected to plead not guilty upon 
the advice of his attorney. Respondent’s attorney allegedly stated that 
because the victim “had been shot below the waist,” the prosecutor would be 
unable to prove intent to murder.165 At trial, the respondent was convicted 
on all counts and was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 185 to 360 
months in prison.166 
In Lafler, the Court sought to provide a remedy to defendants 
prejudiced by an attorney’s ineffective assistance of counsel where the 
ineffective assistance results in the rejection of a plea offer and the 
defendant is convicted at trial. In tackling the remedy, the Court fashioned 
two alternatives and placed them both within the exclusive discretion of the 
trial judge. For the Court, the proper remedy required the prosecution to 
reoffer the plea. Once this occurs, the trial judge may determine within her 
own discretion either to vacate the conviction and accept the plea or allow 
the conviction to stand.167 The Court reasoned that this permits the trial 
court to review the injury suffered by the defendant and in turn, allows the 
trial court to evaluate the case within proper constitutional guidelines. 
D. IN DISSENT 
The dissents of both Frye and Lafler, written by Justice Scalia and joined 
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, rested primarily on the 
principle that the Sixth Amendment guarantees fair trials only.168 Justice 
Scalia’s view is that there is no right to a plea bargain and because of this, 
defendants are not entitled to constitutional remedies premised upon 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea-bargaining context.169 For Justice 
Scalia, the “whole new boutique of constitutional jurisprudence” is 
 
 164. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. at 1389. 
 168. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392–93 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). Justice Alito, as well as Justice Thomas and the Chief Justice also joined Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Frye. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 169. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1394–95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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illegitimate.170 Moreover, the majority’s opinion “elevates plea bargaining 
from a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement.”171 
The trilogy has been hailed as a victory for the civil rights of criminal 
defendants.  However, Justice Scalia’s dissent raised a number of 
jurisprudential problems with the majority’s opinion. Specifically, Justice 
Scalia criticized the Court for opening “a whole new field of 
constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law.”172 Before 
Padilla, the Court had never intervened in the actual plea bargaining 
negotiation process. Instead, the Court largely framed the importance of 
counsel during the plea process as a waiver issue, thereby requiring a 
showing that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived important 
constitutional rights (the right to remain silent, right to a fair trial) and 
entered a valid plea of guilty.173 In a number of cases, the Court had 
highlighted the significance of counsel during the plea process and the ways 
in which counsel serves a critical role in the fair administration of justice.174 
However, it was not until Padilla that the Court unequivocally thrust Sixth 
Amendment protections into the plea negotiation process. And it was not 
until Frye and Lafler that the Court fashioned the Strickland test to 
accommodate the plea-bargaining context so as to firmly entrench the idea 
that effective assistance of counsel is a constitutional imperative in the plea-
negotiation process. 
IV. CONTINUING GIDEON’S LEGACY: PRINCIPLES AND ENFORCEMENT 
The plea-bargaining trilogy is a natural extension of the right to counsel 
jurisprudence. These cases rest on principles announced in previous right to 
counsel cases, including Gideon, Strickland, Hill, and Coleman. The plea-
bargaining cases also recognize that the current system of American justice is 
primarily a system of plea bargaining, as opposed to trials. 
This Part discusses three ways that the Court elaborates on the current 
understanding of the right to counsel in the reasoning of these cases. First, 
the Court specifically recognizes that the plea-bargaining process is itself a 
 
 170. Id. at 1398. 
 171. Id. at 1397. 
 172. Id. at 1391. 
 173. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) (stating that “[p]rior to trial an 
accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an independent examination of the facts, 
circumstances, pleadings and laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what 
plea should be entered”). 
 174. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1961) (holding that when one pleads 
guilty without counsel to a capital charge, prejudice results and the conviction must be 
reversed); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 159 (1957) (holding, in a case involving a guilty 
plea entered without counsel, that “the intervention of counsel, unless intelligently waived by 
the accused, is an essential element of a fair hearing”); Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 
350 U.S. 116, 118–19 (1956) (discussing a guilty plea “where the circumstances show that 
[defendant’s] rights could not have been fairly protected without counsel”).  
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“critical phase” of criminal prosecution, thereby entitling the accused to the 
right to counsel.175 Second, these cases require that the counsel to which the 
accused is entitled must provide effective assistance.176 Finally, by explicitly 
recognizing that the majority of criminal cases are disposed of in the plea-
bargaining process, the Court mandates right to counsel guarantees in the 
specific phase of criminal prosecution where the majority of defendants 
need the advice and skill of counsel the most.177 
Lastly, while the principles espoused in Padilla, Frye, and Lafler accord 
with the contemporary understanding of the right to counsel, this Part will 
argue that they will probably suffer the same fate as the Gideon mandate—
ineffective implementation and enforcement. As with the Gideon opinion, 
the Court in the plea-bargaining trilogy declined to offer any guidance for 
the implementation and enforcement of the right to counsel directives 
announced in the opinions. The recent case of Burt v. Titlow,178 where the 
Court was asked to clarify the standards announced in Frye and Lafler, 
demonstrates that this is already beginning to surface. 
A. CRITICAL STAGE 
As mentioned above, Padilla v. Kentucky announced that the plea-
negotiation process is a “critical stage” of criminal prosecution thereby 
entitling an accused to the right to counsel.179 The significance of this 
principle cannot be overstated. Never before had the Court explicitly 
recognized that the plea-negotiation process was a “critical stage.” While Hill 
asserted that the Strickland test applied to the plea process, it did not 
determine that the plea process was a “critical stage.” Thus, without deciding 
whether the process was a “critical stage” in Hill, the Court punted on the 
issue of whether the right to counsel was always constitutionally mandated in 
the plea-bargaining process. Padilla affirmatively proclaimed this, leaving no 
question whether the plea-bargaining process itself was of constitutional 
significance. Both Frye and Lafler reiterated this principle, thereby further 
entrenching plea bargaining as a “critical stage” in the right to counsel 
jurisprudence.180 
Finding that plea-bargaining negotiation is a “critical stage” also 
coincided to the Court’s jurisprudence in another regard. As Justice Scalia 
asserted in his dissents in Frye and Lafler, plea bargaining is not a 
 
 175. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373–74 (2010). 
 176. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405–06 (2012); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384 (quoting 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 
 177. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407–08. 
 178. Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10 (2013).  
 179. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373–74. 
 180. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384. 
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constitutional right to which the defendant is entitled.181 The labeling of 
plea bargaining as a “critical stage” guarantees a defendant right to counsel 
protections only if the prosecutor decides to engage in the negotiation 
process. Simply labeling the plea-bargaining process a “critical stage” 
maintains the discretion of the prosecutor while protecting the accused if 
the prosecutor does seek to negotiate a plea. 
B. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Padilla, Frye, and Lafler unequivocally declare that an accused is entitled 
to the right to effective assistance of counsel. While Hill requires that the 
Strickland test is used in the plea process, the plea-bargaining trilogy does 
more. First, all three cases, like Hill, apply the ineffective assistance of 
counsel standards to the substantive content of the advice given by counsel 
in the plea-negotiation process itself. In Padilla, the Court analyzed whether 
the attorney’s advice to his client regarding the deportation consequences of 
a guilty plea constituted deficient performance.182 Frye concerned an 
attorney’s failure to communicate formal plea-bargaining offers to his 
client.183 Finally, Lafler involved an attorney’s misadvice to his client 
regarding the client’s chances of acquittal at trial.184 Each case specifically 
analyzed the advice (or lack thereof) that counsel gave the defendant during 
the plea-negotiation process itself, thus ascribing constitutional importance 
to the dialogue between counsel and her client. By looking at substantive 
advice as opposed to procedural aspects of plea bargaining, the Court 
effectively created a constitutional porthole into the plea-bargaining process 
in which to assess attorney performance. While the Court did not go as far as 
to label plea bargaining a constitutional entitlement, it did affirmatively 
offer constitutional protections to criminal defendants in the substantive 
advice that they receive from defense counsel. 
The plea-bargaining trilogy modifies the Strickland test to accommodate 
the plea-negotiation process. Padilla itself imported direct language from 
Strickland for the purpose of analyzing the performance prong of the test.185 
Both Padilla and Frye analyzed counsel’s conduct, finding deficient 
performance in each case.186 In both cases, the Court looked to the 
prevailing norms in the profession as described by the ABA in the context of 
pleas.187 Frye went a step further and analyzed the prejudice prong of 
 
 181. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412, 1413–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397–98 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 182. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359–60. The Court remanded for a determination on prejudice. 
Id. at 368–69. 
 183. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404. 
 184. Lafler, 132 S. Ct at 1383. 
 185. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366–67. 
 186. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408–09; Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366–68. 
 187. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408; Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366–67. 
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Strickland, but restructured that part of the test to correspond to the plea-
bargaining process.188 Lafler concerned the remedies associated with a 
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the plea-negotiation 
context.189 With this, the Court extended effective assistance of counsel to 
plea bargaining while simultaneously tailoring the Strickland test to fit the 
realities of the plea-bargaining process. 
C. A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT 
The right-to-counsel jurisprudence recognizes the necessity of defense 
counsel in criminal prosecutions. Beginning with Powell v. Alabama, the 
Court has acknowledged that an accused “lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he ha[s] a perfect one. He 
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him.”190 Relying heavily on the principles espoused in Powell, the 
Gideon Court reiterated the belief that the right to defense counsel in a 
criminal prosecution is of a fundamental nature in the American system of 
justice.191 
The novelty in the plea-bargaining trilogy is the majority’s explicit 
recognition that criminal adjudications are principally disposed of by plea 
bargaining and because of this the accused is entitled to effective assistance 
of counsel. Providing statistics on the rate of convictions resolved by plea, 
the Court reasoned in Frye that because plea bargaining is the primary mode 
of disposition in criminal cases, “the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather 
than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a 
defendant.”192 Thus, the Court’s opinions in Padilla, Frye, and Lafler are 
grounded in a realistic assessment of the current state of affairs in the 
American criminal justice system. 
D. IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
A major problem with the Gideon decision is the lack of guidance to the 
states and lower courts on the implementation and enforcement of its 
directive.193 This Subpart argues that, while seemingly clear, Padilla, Frye, and 
Lafler do indeed present similar problems in implementation and 
enforcement. The dissents in all three cases, as well as the subsequent case 
of Burt v. Titlow, demonstrate that the opinions are obscure and opaque in 
providing guidance on implementation. 
 
 188. Frye, 132 S. Ct at 1409–10. 
 189. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388–90. 
 190. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
 191. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963). 
 192. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
 193. Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2676, 2680 (2013). 
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1. The Dissent 
Justice Scalia, dissenting in all three cases, provides a basis for 
underscoring the potential problems associated with implementation and 
enforcement. In Padilla, Justice Scalia concluded that requiring counsel to 
advise about deportation consequences “has no logical stopping point.”194 
Scalia argued that the Court had failed to discuss what areas of immigration 
law are relevant for purposes of requiring counsel to advise her client195—
must counsel generally state that there may be deportation consequences 
associated with a guilty plea or must counsel provide more specific advice to 
the client regarding definitive consequences of the plea? The Padilla 
majority failed to answer this question stating only that failure to advise a 
client regarding deportation consequences amounts to deficient 
performance under Strickland. 
In Frye, Justice Scalia again chastised the majority for its failure to 
explicitly state the requirements for defense counsel during the plea-
negotiation process.196 The Court determined that bargaining during the 
plea process is “by its nature, defined to a substantial degree by personal 
style,”197 but Justice Scalia found the statement utterly unhelpful to defense 
counsel attempting to determine the constitutional expectations of effective 
assistance of counsel during plea negotiations.198 The statement itself 
provided no guidance on a constitutional minimum requirement of 
performance by defense counsel in plea bargaining.199 
In Lafler, Justice Scalia derided the “incoherence” of the Court’s remedy 
for a Sixth Amendment violation.200 Noting that the majority opinion says 
that there are “factors” that are to be considered by trial courts in 
determining the remedy for an unconstitutional conviction, Justice Scalia 
pointed out that the Court had failed to announce what exactly these factors 
are.201  In dissent, Justice Scalia opined that giving the trial judge the 
discretion to reoffer a plea when fashioning a remedy for an 
unconstitutional conviction “is a remedy unheard-of in American 
jurisprudence.”202 Thus, he considered the remedy constitutionally baseless 
and believed that it failed to give proper guidance to lower courts. 
 
 194. Kentucky v. Padilla, 559 U.S. 356, 390 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id. at 391. 
 196. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 197. Id. at 1408 (majority opinion). 
 198. Id. at 1412–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 199. Id.  
 200. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. at 1396. 
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2. Burt v. Titlow 
Burt v. Titlow is the most recent case in which the Court granted 
certiorari to review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the plea-
bargaining context. In the case, Titlow was accused of murdering her aunt’s 
husband.203 Michigan originally charged Titlow with first degree murder, but 
offered Titlow a plea deal that would have permitted her to plead guilty to 
manslaughter and face a sentencing range of seven to fifteen years in 
exchange for her testimony against her aunt.204 At the plea hearing, Titlow 
confirmed that she had reviewed all of the evidence and admitted some facts 
that implicated her in the crime.205 The court accepted the plea.206 
Convinced of her innocence, Titlow subsequently hired Attorney Toca.207 
Toca withdrew her plea on the basis of an unacceptable sentencing range 
for manslaughter as opposed to his client’s claimed innocence.208 Titlow 
took the case to trial, was convicted, and was sentenced to between twenty 
and forty years in prison.209 She filed a habeas petition on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically alleging that Toca advised her to 
withdraw the plea without conducting an adequate investigation.210 The 
Sixth Circuit agreed with Titlow and found Toca’s performance 
unreasonable in that he did not adequately investigate and hence was 
ineffective.211 In fashioning a remedy, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case 
with instructions that Michigan reoffer the original plea to Titlow and 
“fashion” the remedy for the Sixth Amendment violation.212 
Two important questions were presented to the Supreme Court for 
review that revolved around Frye and Lafler. The first concerned “[w]hether a 
convicted defendant’s subjective testimony that he would have accepted a 
plea but for ineffective assistance, is, standing alone, sufficient to 
demonstrate a reasonable probability that defendant would have accepted 
the plea.”213 Thus, the issue concerned the Frye prejudice test requiring a 
convicted defendant show that he or she would have accepted the plea but 
for counsel’s deficient performance. The second question asked whether the 
Court’s opinion in Lafler requires a trial court to always resentence a 
 
 203. Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013). 
 204. Id.  
 205. Id. 
 206. Id.  
 207. See id. at 13–14. 
 208. Id.  
 209. Id.  
 210. Id.  
 211. Id. at 13. 
 212. Id. at 14. 
 213. Question Presented at 1, Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ___ (2013) (No. 12-414), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/grantednotedlist.aspx?Filename=13grantednotedlist.html 
(follow 12-414 hyperlink to download “Questions Presented”). 
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defendant who meets the Frye-Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel test 
“in such a way as to ‘remedy’ the violation of the defendant’s constitutional 
right.”214 The Court declined to decide the case on either Frye or Lafler 
grounds and instead elected to decide the issue on the standard of review 
for Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty (“AEDPA”) claims.215 In 
demurring on the ineffective assistance of counsel issues, the Court in effect 
left such questions for lower courts to work through for themselves, thereby 
following along the same trajectory as Gideon in implementation and 
enforcement. 
E. SUMMARY 
In Padilla, Frye, and Lafler, the Court made significant symbolic strides in 
recognizing the need for counsel in the plea-bargaining process. 
Constitutionally requiring effective assistance of counsel in the phase of 
criminal prosecution in which most cases are disposed was a necessary step 
in protecting the accused from losing important constitutional guarantees.  
However, as discussed in the dissents as well as demonstrated by Burt v. 
Titlow, the plea-bargaining trilogy’s implementation and enforcement are 
unclear and muddled. Because of the lack of guidance in these opinions, 
lower courts will likely struggle to interpret the full constitutional meaning 
of these cases. As with Gideon, the plea-bargaining cases are on a path of 
various interpretations and a legacy unfulfilled. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Over the past fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Sixth Amendment as including the right to effective 
assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal prosecution. While 
asserting that right to counsel principles are fundamental, the Court has 
declined to provide specific guidance on implementation and enforcement. 
This has resulted in various applications of right to counsel principles cross-
nationally. This was the result with Gideon and it will likely be the result with 
the plea-bargaining cases. The plea-bargaining cases are an exciting 
expansion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. However, the effect of 
these cases on defense representation depends on implementation of the 
plea-bargaining principles. 
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